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A Model of Optimal Corporate Bailouts
Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric Talley, and Ivo Welch∗
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Abstract
We analyze incentive-efficient government bailouts within a canonical model
of intra-firm moral hazard. Bailouts exacerbate the moral hazard of firms and
managers in two ways. First, they make them less averse to failing. Second,
the taxes to fund bailouts dampen their incentives. Nevertheless, if third-party
externalities from keeping the firm alive are strong, bailouts can improve welfare.
Our model suggests that governments should use bailouts sparingly, where social
externalities are large and subsidies small; (often) eliminate incumbent owners and
managers to improve a priori incentives; and finance bailouts through redistributive
taxes on productive firms instead of forcing recipients to repay in the future.
JEL: P16, P14, D72.
Keywords: Government Bailout. Moral Hazard. TARP. General Motors. Chrysler.
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Prior to 2007, most academic economists viewed government bailouts as aberrations
of developing countries, artifacts of political patronage, or idiosyncrasies of the banking
industry. The consensus view of governmental interventions generally—and corporate bailouts
specifically—has been largely negative in light of the moral-hazard problems caused by such
interventions. Even in the banking literature, where a few exceptions (discussed below) can be
found, bailouts rarely garner more than grudging approval. This academic skepticism has a
long pedigree. As early as 1873, Walter Bagehot wrote:
If the banks are bad, they will certainly continue bad and will probably become
worse if the Government sustains and encourages them. The cardinal maxim is, that
any aid to a present bad bank is the surest mode of preventing the establishment of
a future good bank.
Almost a century and a half later, Bagehot’s admonition remains popular among economists. In
his “Blueprints for a New Global Financial Architecture,” for example, Calomiris (2000) opens
with:
Problem 1: Counterproductive financial bailouts of insolvent banks, their creditors, and
debtors by governments, often assisted by the IMF, have large social costs. Bailouts are
harmful for several reasons. First, they entail large increases in taxation of average
citizens to transfer resources to wealthy risk-takers. Tax increases are always
distortionary, and serve to accentuate the unequal wealth distribution. Second,
by bailing out risk takers local governments and the IMF subsidize, and hence
encourage, risk taking. Moral-hazard incentive problems magnify truly exogenous
shocks that confront banking systems. Excessive risk taking by banks results in
banking collapses and produces the fiscal insolvency of governments that bail out
banks, leading to exchange rate collapse. Banks willingly and knowingly take on
more risks—especially default risks and exchange risks—than they would if they
were not protected by government safety nets.
And yet, to the consternation of many economists, and contrary to much received academic
wisdom, governments have time and again ridden to the rescue of banks and other “too big
to fail” institutions during economic crises. Notable recent examples include the controversial
bailouts of General Motors and Chrysler in December 2008. Although the federal govern-
ment provided more than $80 billion in assistance, both companies had to file for Chapter
11 bankruptcy protection by June 2009. Incumbent shareholders were wiped out, senior
management and board members were fired, and labor unions and dealers accepted significant
concessions.
Nevertheless, in succeeding years, some commentators have begun to portray the automobile
bailouts in more charitable tones. In November 2010, BusinessWeek reported:
General Motors Co.’s initial public offering showed that while U.S. President Barack
Obama’s administration may lose billions on the auto-industry bailout, the national
budget and economy might be better off for it.
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The U.S. sold almost half of its stake in the nation’s largest automaker for $33 a
share—about $10 less than it needs to break even. The remaining shares will need
to sell for about $20 higher to make up the difference. GM opened at $35 and
stayed within $1.11 of that price all day. Selling the remaining shares at that price
would produce a loss of about $9 billion.
That may go down as a bargain. The U.S. would have lost $28.6 billion in spending
on social services and missing tax revenue if not for the bailout of GM, its former
lending arm and Chrysler Group LLC, according to a study released Nov. 17 by the
Center for Automotive Research in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
“GM ends up an economic contributor to the U.S. economy,...It’s manufacturing
products, it’s creating jobs, it’s buying wholesale parts, it’s doing what an industrial
company is supposed to do.”
Significant academic skepticism remains to this day about the wisdom of bailouts as a categorical
matter. Thus, the economic crisis of 2008-9 provides an invitation to explore more systematically
when (if at all) bailouts are justified on efficiency grounds, how to structure and finance them,
and how to gauge their success.
Our paper takes a first step, proposing a model for analyzing the tradeoffs involved in
a governmental bailout of a firm. Unlike many models in the banking literature, our firm’s
efficiency problems are not the prospect of bank runs, debt overhang, or other issues specific
to the financial sector. Rather, we study a more canonical firm, which always operates in
the shadow of moral hazard and agency costs. We presume that managers and owners of
the firm are interested only in their own private payoffs, indifferent to externalities created
by the firm’s operations. These externalities accrue to outside constituencies, who derive
socially valuable benefits from the firm’s activities—benefits the firm can neither capture nor
internalize. Such stakeholders include existing and future customers, suppliers, employees,
creditors, entrepreneurs, and “communities” that benefit from the firm’s operation. Their
interests are diffuse and difficult to isolate (much less to coordinate), and they possess little
real or formal influence over corporate decisions.
Unlike managers and owners, however, we presume that the government cares about social
welfare including stakeholder wealth. It compares total welfare in a scenario in which the firm is
ongoing against a scenario in which the firm is defunct. If the non-internalized stakes are large,
then it may have a legitimate interest to keep a moribund firm alive. Yet, accomplishing this is
not easy in our model. The government has no special powers, managerial skills, or access to
unique information. It is not an omniscient social planner with the power to micro-manage
wages or coerce effort. Rather, its abilities are very limited: It can only provide funds to keep
the firm solvent; it can tax firms to finance bailouts; and, it has the power to eliminate existing
owners and management of bailout recipients. We do not even assume that the government is
capable of committing itself to a future bailout policy.
Within this setting, our model considers when the government can (and cannot) serve a
useful purpose in bailing out distressed firms. This is not a simple problem. For all its good
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intentions, government intervention can exacerbate moral hazard: First, bailouts reduce the
incentives of both firms and managers to avoid insolvency. Second, financing a bailout through
taxation reduces profits, which reduces real wages and thus efficient managerial effort. In
our model (as well as in practice), government-introduced moral hazard severely limits the
government’s ability to intervene benevolently. We show that the distortions can be so large
that they prevent an efficient bailout even though it would be socially preferable for the firm to
continue.
Yet at the same time, moral-hazard concerns do not preclude the possibility of efficient
bailouts altogether. To the contrary, we derive conditions under which bailouts are not only
feasible but also welfare enhancing. In this sense, our model can formalize—and in some
ways mediate—the debate between proponents of bailouts (who emphasize the social costs of
allowing firms to fail), and opponents (who emphasize the moral hazard and efficiency losses
of government intervention). Partially agreeing with the former, we argue that bailouts are
sometimes both feasible and justified on efficiency grounds. Partially agreeing with the latter,
we show that even when it would be socially optimal to keep a firm alive, moral-hazard issues
can make the cure worse than the disease.
In addition to characterizing when an efficiency-enhancing bailout exists, we are also
interested in its core terms and attributes. As already noted, our government is quite limited.
It can tax the profits of some or of all firms; it can impose extraordinary taxes on bailed-out
companies that succeed later; it can decide whether to bailout firms and on the amount of
the bailout; and, if it does bailout firms, it can fire or keep the incumbent manager, and it can
eliminate or retain existing owners. In our model, incumbent owners bring no special expertise
to the table that other owners could not provide, so the optimal government bailout either
squeezes them out entirely or leaves them with no economic rents going forward. Similarly,
the government can elicit more effort from managers prior to financial distress by insisting on
punishing (firing) the manager when a bailout is required. When incumbent managers—the
ones that have driven the firm into distress—do not have significant firm-specific skills, this
improves their ex-ante incentives and is thus the optimal government bailout policy.
We further show that financing an optimal bailout in our model is generally best done using
a redistributive tax. That is, an optimal bailout generally does not impose an extraordinary tax
(or its functional equivalent) on rescued firms to contribute to their own bailouts out of future
profits. Rather, it taxes all firms when they are not in need of a bailout, and subsidizes bailout
recipients with few/no financial strings attached. This is because the government already
fully expropriates existing owners and managers. Taxes levied ex post against (new) bailout
recipients must in effect be “priced” into the governmental subsidy. And because such taxes
inefficiently distort incentives, the government is better off imposing lower extraordinary taxes
(and thus paying a smaller bailout subsidy) instead.
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As a practical matter for policy makers, our analysis contains three core prescriptions:
1. Governments should be very conservative in rescuing firms, targeting only those that
provide large stakeholder externalities and those that have a need for relatively modest
capital infusions.
2. Governments should presumptively eliminate existing owners and managers (at least
those with only modest or no firm-specific comparative advantages) in bailouts.
Flannery (2005) argues that banks should issue reverse convertibles—pre-programmed
bailouts. Our paper suggests that such financing would often be more effective if it were
tied with corporate governance sanctions. Any forced conversion due to poor performance
could trigger automatic dismissal of the board and management, reduced management
pay (or loss of earlier benefits, i.e., a clawbacks). To reduce inefficient terminations when
managers are much better than their replacements , a super-majority of shareholder votes
at a special meeting could override this.
3. Governments should finance bailouts through taxation of healthy firms, and not through
(extraordinary) taxation on those bailout recipients that later recover.
Our model provides a means for assessing the interventions under the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP) in 2008-9. First, Treasury acted prudently when it squeezed out both existing
shareholders and incumbent managers of GM and Chrysler. Such actions are consistent with
our model—and were well suited to incentivize other firms (such as Ford) to work harder
to avoid the same fate. In contrast, in many of the bank bailouts, the government was not
particularly ambitious in attempting to displace the owners and managers who presided over
the banks’ declines, much less to claw back managers’ accrued salaries and benefits (Bebchuk,
Cohen and Spamann (2010)). (It is difficult to argue that the managers and traders that had
failed to curb the risks of these firms were so valuable that they were irreplaceable.) Our model
suggests that full expropriation, not only of the shareholders and their boards, but also of the
managers, should be a presumptive aspect of an optimal bailout as a means for deterring future
crises.
Second, our model causes us to be critical of the government’s intermittent emphasis on
generating an “investment return” from bailout funds. In virtually every TARP bailout, the
government functionally levied an extraordinary ‘tax’ on recipients by structuring its cash
infusions as either loans or stock purchases. The political appeal of generating a return from
ownership stakes is apparent. However, our model points out that government ownership
reduced the participation of private investors, which we assume to have superior ability to
run corporations. In turn, this reduced the efficiency of bailed-out firms. The government
stakes may therefore have crowded out private investors, increased the up-front bailout costs,
and diminished the prospects for success. A preferable alternative would have been for the
government to sell immediately its stakes to private owners who possessed better capabilities
to run the failed firm than the government itself.1
1In one sense, perhaps, under the GM and Chrysler bailouts the government arguably enjoyed competence
that rivaled that of private owners. Its task force, responsible for the initial stage of the resuscitation, consisted of
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Finally, our model suggests that bailouts are better funded through special taxes on healthy
firms than through retrospective assessments on bailout recipients (in the form of government
owned debt and equity). Early drafts of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act proposed the creation
of $50 billion bailout fund financed by healthy firms deemed to be systemically significant.
Ironically, opponents in the Senate ultimately blocked this proposal, asserting that it would
exacerbate moral hazard (Schwarcz (2011)). Our model suggests, quite to the contrary, that the
bailout fund approach can be well suited to mitigate the moral hazard that bailouts inevitably
introduce.2
As with any theoretical model, our prescriptive insights are subject to caveats and limitations
that depend on context.
First, if the government forces out the owners and managers of failed firms, equally
competent replacements may not be readily available. Yet, because these parties are the same
ones that presided over their firms’ declines, they are plausibly dispensable—as they were in
the aforementioned GM and Chrysler bailouts.3 Nevertheless, in Section 4.1, we show that
our model is robust to introducing an efficiency loss when a competent party would have to
be succeeded by a less competent replacement. If this loss is large, the government may or
may not choose not to remove incumbent owners or managers of bailed out firms, even if
committing to do so would still be optimal ex ante. Consequently, the absence of competent
replacements tends to contract (but not necessarily eliminate) the set of contingencies where
intervention is socially beneficial.
Second, our model identifies one costs of government intervention to be the need to tax
firms ex-ante to cover the cost of subsidies. This reduces the manager’s effort and thus creates a
social cost. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we show that our model is robust to extending the taxation
base, either to firms that are not potentially subject to bailouts, or, even more broadly, to other
parties. (For example, stakeholders who benefit from the continued existence of the firm would
be a natural source for tax revenues.) Enhancing the government’s ability to tax expands the
circumstances in which intervention is socially beneficial.
Third, our analysis presumes that the government’s goal is to maximize expected social
welfare (subject to budget balancing and general incentive/participation constraints). Although
this goal seems defensible on both positive and normative grounds, governmental actors may
a team of unusually competent outside private-equity capitalists with business expertise. Moreover, it appears
that the task force was not as motivated by a desire to enrich itself, as by a desire for public service (which our
model does not allow for). Thus, the government may have followed not the letter, but the spirit of our model’s
recommendation. And, as our model suggests, by 2010, the government had begun to divest its stake in GM.
2It is debatable whether the government will have the capability not to intervene if it will be socially optimal to
intervene. Our model suggests that a commitment to expropriate the corporate owners and managers may be
more effective than an attempt to limit the pool of funds for bailouts in the future. After all, there was no such
fund in place in 2008-9, either, and yet the government did rescure firms.
3Recall also that, in our model, we do not expect the government to train managers, to manage the firm itself,
or to control the firm in an active fashion. It is often implausible that government can do this better than the
free market. In our model, government primarily intervenes with funding, and, if it does so, secondarily with the
ability to force the firm to fire the manager.
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episodically harbor other objectives—such as maximizing the return on investment in bailed-out
firms.4 However, if government really views itself as a taxpayer-sponsored vulture fund, then
governmental action is likely ill-suited to address most social externalities problems.
Fourth, government may simply be too wasteful to function effectively as a tax administrator
or overseer of rescued firms. This undermines the attractiveness of government interventions
writ large. However, our model is robust to the introduction of waste at moderate levels, which
tend to shrink—but not necessarily eliminate—the contingencies where efficient bailouts are
feasible and desirable. Of course, when governmental waste grows prohibitively large relative
to the social benefits of bailouts, the efficiency case for intervention disappears altogether.
Fifth, our model considers one bailout at a time. In a crisis, many firms may simultaneously
need capital, possibly making government less inclined to hand out subsidies. On the other
hand, it is plausible that deadweight losses arising from liquidation are higher during crises,
which should induce government to be more inclined to bail out firms.
Finally, even when bailouts are justified on efficiency grounds, they may not win popular
support among the most focal (or vocal) constituencies. Indeed, we show that the distribution
of costs and benefits from bailouts in our model would likely augur resistance among the
Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, and (perhaps) labor unions: viewed ex ante,
even optimal bailouts leave them worse off. (Of course, the same parties will not fight bailouts
in actual distress if they can then avoid complete expropriation.) Naturally, when one factors in
the benefit of other stakeholders as well, optimal bailouts remain welfare enhancing.
Our paper now proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the model setup, characterizes the
first-best solution, and formally states the optimal bailout design problem. Section 2 analyzes
the constraints, working backwards through the equilibria at each stage. Section 3 characterizes
the terms of an optimal bailout. Section 3.1 illustrates the model solutions graphically. Section 4
discusses a number of extensions to the base model, including the potential inefficiency of
replacement managers, access to alternative sources of public funds, firm heterogeneity, and
the possibility of holdup by bailout recipients. Section 5 revies some related literature, and
Section 6 concludes.
1 Framework and Model
Our model’s main ingredients are as canonical as possible. A firm has a project that has an
up-front investment cost, and positive revenues if the project succeeds. The success probability
increases with the effort of a manager who dislikes effort but can be motivated with a success-
contingent wage. The model’s innovations are that a failing firm has a second opportunity to
4For example, in its March 2011 report, the TARP Congressional Oversight Panel notes that the US Treasury
officials at times tended to alternate inconsistently between articulating social welfarist goals (e.g., employment,
economic growth, investment) and recouping a return on investment for taxpayers (Congressional Oversight
Panel 2011, page 188).
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try to restart the project (at a cost) and that the government can intervene.
1.1 Sequential Structure
The model has three discrete time periods, t ∈ {0, 1,2}, with no inter-temporal discounting,
and three participants: a firm, a manager, and the government. The sequence is as follows:
Time 0: • The government announces a bailout policy


g, T1, T2, FG

, the terms of which
are described below.
Time 1: • The firm decides whether to invest in a project with initial cost, I1 > 0.
• The project can be a “success,” yielding a gross payoff R> 0, or a “failure,” yielding
gross payoff 0.
• The probability of success depends on managerial effort. We assume the probability
of success is the manager’s effort level e1. Thus, the project fails with probability
(1− e1).5
• If the project succeeds, the firm must pay the manager a contingent wage of w1 ≥ 0
and the government a tax of T1 ≥ 0.6 The game then ends.
• If the project fails, the game transitions to time 2, described next.
Effort should not be taken literally here. It is a modeling device to characterize a conflict
of interest between managers and owners that needs to be remedied by paying a success-
contingent wage. The conflict could equally well be a desire to build empires or not to
perform unpleasant tasks (such as fighting bureaucracy or unions).






. This is tantamount to assuming that the government cannot
commit itself to a time-inconsistent policy.
• The firm has a real option of either abandoning the project or “restarting” it for an
additional investment of I2 > 0. If the firm restarts, the firm can dismiss or keep the
manager, F F = {FIRE, RETAIN}.
• If the firm restarts, it may use a government-provided cash subsidy (or “bailout”)
of g ≥ 0, which effectively underwrites a portion of the reinvestment costs. In
addition, if the firm accepts the subsidy g, and it has not already fired the manager,
the government can force dismissal of the manager, FG = {FIRE, RETAIN}.
5At the cost of tractability, one could introduce alternative algebraic specifications translating effort into success
probability. That said, because “effort” has no natural measuring unit, we lose little or no generality from our
current setup, which uses convex effort costs and basic parameter restrictions (c > (R+ S)) to bound 0≤ e1 ≤ 1.
6As is customary in this literature, we do not allow the manager to purchase the firm and thus circumvent
the main incentive problem. The nonnegativity of wages is the functional equivalent of limited liability for the
manager. It is easy to introduce private managerial benefits if the project succeeds. In contrast to wages, private
benefits are obtained even without managerial effort. Like wages, they accrue only upon success. The conclusions
of our model remain unaltered, because the benefits simply serve to reduce the wage that the firm needs to pay
managers.
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• A “restarted” project proceeds much like in the first period, with the exception
that there are no additional restarts. Thus, the restarted project can either succeed
(again yielding payoff R) or fail (yielding payoff 0), with the probability of success
corresponding to managerial effort at time 2, e2.
• If the restarted project succeeds, the firm must pay the manager wages of w2 ≥ 0
and the government an (extraordinary) tax of T2 ≥ 0.7
• The game ends, regardless of success or failure.
We consider cases in which the parameters render it optimal for entrepreneurs to set up
firms at time 1 even without government subsidies. In real life, especially if other less elastic
markets can be taxed, there may well be situations in which firms produce social externalities
that are high enough to warrant subsidies even when they do not run into trouble. However,
this is not the problem that our model is analyzing.
1.2 Additional Assumptions
The manager bears a private cost of providing effort of c/2·e2t , where c > 0 is assumed
“large” relative to other parameters.8 Thus, single-period managerial utility at time t is mt =
et ·wt − c·e2t /2.
In designing its bailout policy, we require the government to break even actuarially. This
means that if it chooses to adopt a bailout policy (g > 0), then the government must be able
to raise sufficient revenues through taxes (T1 and T2) to finance the bailout. Our model thus
reflects Calomiris (2000) points that both the fund-raising (taxation) and the fund-distribution
(bailouts) have welfare costs. In reality, taxation could be more or less distortionary than it
is in our model. In addition, taxes distort effort incentives in our model because wages are
not tax-deductible. However, all our important results are robust even if the taxation funding
welfare loss is zero and if wages are fully tax-deductible.9
Finally, we assume that there exists an additional public benefit S, which embodies the
payoff of other stakeholders if the firm succeeds. It is important that neither the firm nor the
manager can capture their surplus, e.g., because they are too diffuse and heterogeneous. In
our basic model, the recipients of these benefits are also beyond the taxation power of the
government. (In Section 4.3, we discuss a variant of our model in which other parties, such as
the externality recipients, can be taxed.)
In all, our framework contains five exogenous parameters, consisting of investment costs
I1 and I2, success-contingent revenues R, a managerial effort cost parameter c, and external
7Note that T2 is an extraordinary tax only on bailed-out firms. (The model should be viewed as repeating both
of its two stages in future periods. Thus, after any bailouts, firms will be taxed just like ordinary firms.)
8Specifically, we assume that c > (R+ S). This is necessary and sufficient to keep the first-best effort below 1.
9In particular, the optimal tax T2 continues to be zero, and the decision to retain or fire the manager remains
the same. (To make wages tax-deductible, the gross payoff in π2 would change from R−T2−w2 to (R−w)·(1−τ2)
on Page 12.)
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stakeholder benefits S. For notational convenience, Ω ≡


I1, I2, R, c, S

. Our model has
eleven endogenous variables, consisting of the manager’s efforts in each period (e1, e2), wages
in each period (w1, w2), the firm’s choice of whether to operate in each period (ρ1,ρ2) ∈





decisions whether to fire the manager, both by the firm F F ∈ {FIRE, RETAIN} and by the government


















g, T1, T2, FG

.
1.3 The First-Best Solution
We first consider the socially first-best effort if it is socially beneficial for the firm to operate.10
The expected social welfare in period t ∈ {1,2} is
svt = et · (R+ S)−
c·e2t
2
− It . (1)
Accounting for transitions between states, ex-ante total expected social welfare is
SV = sv1( e1 ) + (1− e1)·sv2( e2 ) . (2)





















The second expression shows that anticipated downstream investment costs I2 enhance the
optimal effort level at time 1. This is because transitions to time 2 grow more socially costly in
I2. In contrast, the investment at time 1 is effectively sunk by time 2 and does not affect the
optimal period-2 effort.
These first-best effort levels yield expected total social welfare of
SV |( eFB1 ,eFB2 ) = sv1( e
FB





= (R+ S)2 ·















− I1− I2 .
Due to agency costs and financing constraints, this first-best solution is unattainable. It is only
a benchmark for later comparisons.
1.4 Optimal Bailout Design





expected total social value SV (Σ|Ω), subject to a number of incentive constraints, participation
10Appendix A.1 discusses the necessary and sufficient parameter restrictions for it to be socially optimal for the
firm to operate, and for the manager’s optimal efforts to be interior. We impose these restrictions on what follows.
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constraints, and budgetary constraints. Each of these constraints warrants a brief discussion
before we formally state the design problem.
The first set of constraints concerns incentive compatibility: Both the manager’s and the
firm’s strategies (Σm and Σ f , respectively) must be part of a Bayesian-perfect equilibrium,
so that they choose strategies that maximize their expected payoffs—M(Σ|Ω) and Π(Σ|Ω),
respectively, where M is managerial utility and Π is corporate profit—at every continuation
game, given their beliefs.11 In addition, we require that the government’s strategy ΣG must
also be part of a Bayesian perfect equilibrium. Given that the government is presumed to
maximize SV (·), this is functionally equivalent to assuming that the government has limited
ability to commit and thus maximizes social welfare at each continuation stage. More formally,
if Γ(SV (·), M(·),Π(·),Σ,Ω) denotes the game established by our framework, and B(Γ ) denotes






The second set of constraints concerns participation by the firm and the manager. We
require that under the optimal bailout plan, the firm is still willing to invest, and the manager is
still willing to work for the firm. Thus, we require both parties to achieve expected payoffs that
exceed their reservation utilities (which we normalize at zero). Formally, individual rationality
requires that both M (Σ|Ω)≥ 0 and Π(Σ|Ω)≥ 0.
The third constraint concerns budgetary feasibility. Specifically, we require that the bailout
program achieves actuarial budget balance, so that the expected tax received by the government
(through T1 and T2) can finance the expected bailout costs.
12 In effect, the actuarial budget
balance requirement constitutes the government’s de facto participation constraint. Formally,



















(IR) : M(Σ|Ω)≥ 0; Π(Σ|Ω)≥ 0









where (IC), (IR), and (BB) are the incentive, participation, and budget-balance constraints.
11For the exposition here, we slightly abused notation by not differentiating between the period-2 strate-
gies/payoffs of the retained manager and those of her replacement (if the incumbent is fired). This is without
loss of generality, because the incumbent and replacement cases are mutually exclusive, and because they face
identical continuation payoffs / strategies as of period 2. That said, we are careful to distinguish in what follows
how the retention of the incumbent affects her first period behavior.
12The assumption that the government actuarially balances its budget (instead of on a firm-by-firm basis) is
natural. The government regulates an entire population of firms and balance budgeting is a condition that holds
in the aggregate. Actuarial budget balancing is only the per-firm analog of an aggregate budget-balance condition.
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2 Analysis of Constraints
In order to solve for the optimal bailout, it is necessary to describe the constraints within each
continuation game, working backwards in sequence. We begin with the restart stage, then
move back to the initial project stage, and finally describe the optimal design of bailout policy.
2.1 Restarted Projects (Period 2)
Consider the players’ optimal strategy at time 2 for a project that has failed at time 1, supposing
first that the firm has restarted the project (so that investment I2 and bailout g are already
sunk). The firm offers the manager a contract paying w2 in the event that the project succeeds
at time 2, and zero otherwise. (The continuation game is the same if the period-1 manager is
replaced.) The manager now expects to receive m2 ≡ e2·w2− c·e22/2. Her payoff-maximizing
effort is e∗2(w2 ) = w2/c, which results in expected continuation profits for the firm of π2 =
e∗2(w2 )·(R− T2−w2). Assuming the firm operates, it optimally pays a success-contingent wage






The continuation value of a restarted project for the manager is therefore













The firm’s expected time 2 profits (now inclusive of bailout subvention and restart costs) are











+ g − I2 .
Sequential rationality requires that the firm restarts if and only if its expected profits are
nonnegative. The firm’s optimal restart strategy is
ρ∗2 =
¨
IN if π∗2( g, T2 )≥ 0 ,
OUT otherwise.
Larger governmental subsidies push the firm toward restarting, while taxes on successful
restarts push the firm towards abandoning.
Finally, the government’s interim payoff at this stage is













− I2 if ρ∗2 = IN
0 otherwise.
13Even when T2 = 0, managerial effort is below first-best, eFB2 = (R+ S)/c. The government has neither the
ability to set wages nor the ability to coerce the manager into providing first-best effort. (It can also not pay the
firm negative taxes to increase the incentives.) Thus, governmental intervention is not able to achieve first-best.
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As long as the firm reinvests, sv∗2( g, T2 ) is invariant in g, and strictly decreasing in T2. Moreover,





must remain optimal at time 2. This leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 1 The optimal bailout policy sets T ∗2 = 0. Moreover, the optimal bailout pays a positive
subsidy g∗ only if R2/(4·c)− I2 < 0, and sets g∗ = I2 − R2/(4·c), so that the firm earns zero
continuation rents, i.e., π∗2( g
∗, T ∗2 ) = 0.
(All lemmas and theorems are proven in the Appendix.) Although it is surprising at first that
T2 = 0, the intuition is straightforward. Any marginal increase in T2 inefficiently reduces
managerial effort. As T2 increases, the tax distortion causes firm profits to fall even faster
than tax revenues rise, sharpening the government’s balance budget constraint. Consequently,
the government can do no better than to drive T2 to zero, and instead to finance any bailout
entirely by time 1 tax revenues (and paying out the residual bailout surplus, if any, as a cash
grant to the firm or other members of society). In contrast, although T1 also distorts first-period
effort, it does not necessarily do so in a self-defeating way, because T1 is not capitalized into
the required bailout subsidy.14
This insight in turn provides the basis for the second part of Theorem 1. Optimal bailouts
must raise revenue solely from T1, but the distortions caused by T1 > 0 are socially costly as
well. Any optimal bailout should avoid “overfunding” the minimal subsidy needed to induce
continuation. Consequently, an optimal bailout must set both g and T1 to the lowest amount
that prevents closing. It also implies that the optimal policy does not subsidize firms that would
reinvest without government intervention (i.e., those for whom π∗2(0, 0 ) = R
2/(4·c)− I2 ≥ 0).
Therefore, Theorem 1 also states that when the optimal bailout involves a positive transfer, it
sets g to be I2− R2/(4·c), just enough to induce reinvestment but leaving the existing owners
with zero continuation profits. (In practice, this would often be done through expropriation in
a formal Chapter 11 bankruptcy.)
A direct implication of Theorem 1 is that any feasible bailout funded entirely by T2 (with
T1 = 0) is worse than a government non-intervention policy. This is because any bailout that
is funded entirely by T2 revenues can only bail out firms that would restart on their own, i.e.,
without any assistance (or tax) from the government.
Collecting results from the analysis of time 2, interim incentive and participation constraints







, T ∗2 = 0, g
∗ =
¨
0 if π∗2(0, 0 ) ≥ 0
−π2(0, 0 ) if π∗2(0, 0 ) < 0
, ρ∗2 =
¨
IN if π∗2( g
∗, T ∗2 )≥ 0
OUT otherwise
,
where π2(0,0 ) = R2/(4·c)− I2. We will impose these conditions in the analysis of the time 1
behavior that now follows.
14This result contrasts with the standard “Ramsey pricing” intuition in optimal tax literature, where the taxes on
two activities (here time 1 and 2 production) would be set to equilibrate marginal efficiency costs.
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2.2 Initial Projects (Period 1)
We now characterize how the firm and manager determine first-period wages and effort, as
well as whether the firm invests in the first instance. The players’ strategic interactions take





. We therefore subdivide our analysis into two cases: (A) g∗ = 0, which is
non-intervention; and (B) g∗ = I2−R2/4·c, where the firm is rescued, but existing shareholders
realize zero continuation payoffs.




If g∗ = 0, the government has no bailout costs and maximal slack in its financing constraint.
Thus, T ∗1 = T
∗
2 = 0. This is complete nonintervention.
If the firm never starts, all profits and wages are zero. If it does start, firms enters the
continuation game only with probability 1− e1, because with probability e1 the game has ended
with immediate success. If the parties do enter the continuation game, their respective payoffs
depend on whether the firm reinvests (which occurs only if π∗2(0, 0 ) = R
2/(4·c)− I2 ≥ 0); and
if so, whether the incumbent manager is retained into the second period. We must therefore
distinguish between three subcases:
1. The firm abandons the project because π∗2(0,0 )< 0.
2. The firm restarts the project because π∗2(0, 0 )≥ 0, and fires the incumbent manager.
3. The firm restarts the project because π∗2(0, 0 )≥ 0, and retains the incumbent manager.
Subcase 1: Firm Abandons Project. If π∗2(0,0 ) < 0, absent governmental intervention,
the firm always abandons a failed project.15 With no chance of continuation, both the firm and
























15This is the only subcase where an efficient bailout may exist. We will therefore focus on this case again in the
government intervention case in Section 2.2.2.
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In sum, when restarts are unprofitable, the firm’s optimal first-period investment strategy is
ρ∗1 =
¨
IN if Π|ρ2=OUT ≥ 0 ,
OUT otherwise .
Subcase 2: Firm Restarts Project With Different Manager. Now suppose thatπ∗2(0, 0 )≥
0, so that the firm restarts, and assume as well that the firm could commit to fire the incumbent
manager after an initial failure. Thus, at time 1, the manager continues to view this as a





Consequently, her first-period effort remains e∗1(w1 ) = w1/c. In contrast, the firm anticipates
operating in the second period under a different manager. Its continuation profit is thus

















which implies a profit-maximizing wage of w∗1 = R+ I2/2− R









yielding maximized profits of Π|F F=FIRE( e∗1 ) (Appendix equation A.1). Note that when the firm
can profitably restart, it optimally sets lower-powered first-period incentives than it would
in the absence of the restart option.16 Intuitively, restarting gives the firm a “second bite at
the apple,” which reduces the importance of first-period success. The firm therefore reduces
first-period wages (and with it, managerial effort). From the incumbent manager’s perspective,
the restart option makes her worse off, because it depresses her first-period wage. The restart
benefits accrue to the firm and the replacement manager through the second-period payoffs.
Subcase 3: Firm Restarts Project With Same Manager. Finally, suppose once again
that π2(0, 0 )≥ 0, so that the firm restarts, but now the incumbent manager is retained. In this





























which implies effort of e∗1(w1 ) = w1/c−R
2/(8·c2). Comparing this expression with the effort in
Section 2.2.1 (where the incumbent is fired) shows the moral hazard that managerial retention
in a restart induces. If the manager knows that she, too, will receive a second chance if the
first-period effort fails, she has an incentive to withhold R2/(8·c2) first-period effort at every
wage level.
Anticipating the effort given wage, the firm maximizes

































/2− R2/(16·c)> 0. Given this wage,








yielding maximized profits of Π|F F=RETAIN( e∗1 ) (Appendix equation A.2). Note that first-period
wages are higher here than in the case where the incumbent is fired, reflecting the firm’s
attempt to dampen managerial moral hazard with higher wages. Nevertheless, the higher wage
only helps somewhat—first-period managerial effort remains lower than when the manager is
fired.
Comparing subcases 2 and 3 yields the following lemma:
Lemma 1 If the incumbent and replacement are equally productive, in the absence of government
intervention, the firm should replace the incumbent manager whenever it restarts the project.
(In Section 4.1, we consider cases in which the incumbant is more productive than the potential
replacement.) Lemma 1 establishes the optimality of firing the manager after a first-period
failure in the absence of government intervention. This is the case even though we do not
assume that the firm learns about managerial (lack of) ability from the first-period failure.
Intuitively, the credible threat to fire the manager induces greater managerial effort (and less
moral hazard) in the first period, because the manager correctly perceives that she has only
one chance to succeed. As long as a replacement manager is equally efficient (e.g., faces the
same marginal effort costs), then the firm’s second period payoffs are the same regardless of
whether it is managed by the incumbent manager or her replacement.
Thus, when restarts are profitable and the government does not intervene, the firm always
fires the incumbent upon a restart, and the firm’s initial investment decision is
ρ∗1 =
¨
IN if Π|F F=FIRE( e∗1 )≥ 0 ,
OUT otherwise .
.
As already mentioned, equal efficiency of managerial replacements sidesteps any time consis-
tency (commitment) problems by the firm (and later the government). Given that the original
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managers forced the firm into distress, it is plausible to assume that replacement managers are
likely to be at least as efficient as the original managers.17
2.2.2 Case B: Intervention
 
g∗ = I2− R2/4·c

Now consider the case where the government pays a positive bailout with g∗ = I2 − R2/4·c.
As previously noted, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for efficient intervention is




< 0, so that the firm would never restart the project in the absence
of the bailout. We therefore confine our discussion below to that parametric case. Although the
bailed-out firm reinvests, it earns zero continuation profits, so that π∗2( g
∗, T ∗2 ) = 0. In the case
of intervention, we must distinguish two subcases:
1. The bailed-out firm restarts the project and fires the incumbent manager.
2. The bailed-out firm restarts the project and retains the incumbent manager.
Subcase 1: Bailed-Out Firm Restarts with Different Manager. When the incumbent






Her optimal effort is e∗1(w1 ) = w1/c. The owners also expect to receive nothing at time 2, and
set the wage to maximize









The firm’s profit-maximizing wage offer is therefore w∗1 = (R− T1)/2. Compare this wage to
that in Section 2.2.1, where there was no government and the firm also fired the manager




/2− R2/ (8·c), showed that the continuation
investment cost had a positive effect on the wage, while the manager’s moral hazard had a
negative effect. If the government intervenes and the manager is also fired in such a restart,
then the positive impact of the reinvestment cost (+I2) is replaced with the negative impact
of first-period taxation (−T1). In addition, the moral-hazard term −R2/(8·c) term is missing.
Thus, the incumbent manager may or may not be paid more at time 1 in the presence of a
government than in its absence.





17In the real world, if the manager is not fired, it could imply not just that the next-best alternative manager is
worse, but that the manager has “captured” the firm’s board in the Bebchuk and Fried (2004) sense. If managerial
capture causes the firm not to fire the manager, then government intervention can add more value by firing the
manager during a restart with a government subsidy.
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and the firm payoffs are






Subcase 2: Bailed-Out Firm Restarts with Same Manager. If instead the manager is
retained, then she expects to receive positive continuation payoffs in the amount m∗2( g
∗) =













which yields an effort level (as a function of wages) of e∗1(w1 ) = w1/c − R
2/(8·c2). The second
term is the manager’s option to continue even when the firm is bailed out—i.e., the manager’s
moral hazard. Therefore, the firm chooses w1 to maximize its first-period profits,





































Note that, similar to the case of non-intervention, first-period effort is lower when the incumbent
manager is retained after a bailout. When the manager expects positive rents even in the
bailout state, she rationally spends less in effort costs to avoid that state. Firm profits are












Comparing the two subcases leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 2 As long as the incumbent and replacement are equally productive, the optimal bailout
policy replaces the manager whenever the firm receives a bailout.
Similar to Lemma 1 in the non-intervention case, Lemma 2 states that retaining the manager is
never optimal. A credible threat to fire the manager upon a bailout improves her first-period
incentives without affecting second period effort. As long as the replacement manager is as
proficient as her predecessor, this results in a net gain.
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Consequently, when the optimal bailout calls for intervention, the government always fires





IN if Π|FG=FIRE =
(R−T1)2
4·c
− I1 ≥ 0 ,
OUT otherwise .
.
A comparison of the firm’s total profits with and without government intervention yields
the following lemma:




< 0, government intervention makes the firm and the
incumbent manager worse off. The losses to the firm and the manager are increasing in T1.
Without government intervention, the firm’s continuation value is zero in the reinvestment




< 0, because the firm will choose not to reinvest. With
government intervention, the firm reinvests after receiving a bailout g∗ = I2 − R2/(4·c), but
its continuation value is still zero (see Theorem 1). However, the firm is worse off, because
the government finances the bailout with taxes T1 in the initial stage, reducing the firm’s total
profits. (In response, the firm pays the manager a lower wage, making her worse off as well).
Hence, another cost of government intervention is that it increases the tax burden on successful
firms (and managers) without an accompanying benefit in the event of a bailout, thereby
dampening the incentive for the firm to invest in the initial stage.
3 The Optimal Bailout (Period 0)
We can now state our main result. The optimal government bailout policy, with respect to the
program in (3), is:




− I2 < 0;
































4. S ≥ S ,
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T ∗2 = 0 ,
FG = FIRE .
Otherwise, the optimal bailout policy mandates non-intervention,
¬




= 〈0,0, 0, .〉.
The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix A.6. The first condition insures that healthy firms
are ineligible for bailouts: i.e., if the firm would restart without government intervention, it
should not receive a bailout. The second condition insures that the reinvestment costs I2 are
not so high as to make it impossible to generate enough tax revenue through T1. The third
condition insures that the firm is still willing to invest in the project under the optimal bailout
at time 1. The fourth condition insures that the social benefits S must achieve some minimal
value to justify the intervention in the first place.
The economic intuition for the theorem is as follows. At core, the key efficiency consideration
is keeping the manager’s effort levels high in both periods. The government can do this only
indirectly, by paying the owners a lump-sum bailout. However, such a transfer payment to
owners is a blunt instrument—much of it will not be used to incentivize managers, but will
be effectively pocketed as profits. (Direct payment to managers is not unhelpful unless it is
linked to success—and, if the government were to pay directly to managers, the firm could
substitute out its own wage payments.) Because government subsidies to the firm have to be
financed with distortionary taxes, the government is better abstaining from intervention if the
firm would restart without a subsidy.
When a positive bailout is paid, g is set just high enough to keep the firm in business (in
order to preserve the social benefits S). If g were any higher than is necessary, taxes would also
necessarily be larger (directly disincentivizing effort), and the surplus would go to owners who
would not use all of it to incentivize managers to work harder. Thus, g is the smallest amount
necessary to keep the firm in business.
Theorem 2 also restates the intuition (originally from Theorem 1) that the optimal tax
structure for financing bailouts sets T ∗2 = 0. In other words, it is never optimal to impose an
extraordinary tax on rescued firms (or any functional equivalent) requiring them to finance their
own bailout from future revenues. Rather, redistributional taxes on the first-period successful
firms are the optimal way to finance bailouts.18 The intuition here is as follows: when the
18In successive generations, an ongoing bailed-out firm would presumably pay ordinary time 1 taxes in future
periods, just like other firms. Note also that if managers and owners are not fully expropriated in a bailout, it may
then become optimal for the government to expropriate some of their residual surplus through other means, such
as otherwise non-optimal taxes. This will have positive welfare effects.
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government bails out the firm optimally, it already leaves existing owners with nothing. Any tax
T2 negatively distorts managerial effort, reduces the firm’s firm variable profits, and therefore
requires an even larger transfer payment to restart the firm. (If anything, the government would
like to impose a negative tax on revenues, thus rewarding firm owners more if the bailed out
firm succeeds. However, we do not allow for success-contingent subsidies.)
This leaves only T1 to fund any bailout. The tax-revenue it generates depends on managerial
effort at time 1, which depends on the managerial wages at time 1, which in turn depends on
the tax T1 that the firm has to pay. The T
∗
1 above is the smallest possible self-funded tax that
ensures efficient continuation of distressed firms. Even there, however, as Theorem 2 notes,
when I2 is high it may simply be impossible to raise the required from tax revenues. Moreover,
even if it were possible to do so, the firm may never afford that opportunity, because it never
initially invests. All told, although Theorem 2 makes a case for redistributive bailouts, it also
suggests that such bailouts should be utilized only sparingly. Finally, by insisting on the firing
of the manager in case of a restart, there will be less need for bailouts, because the managerial
moral hazard will be lower.19
Analyzing the terms of the optimal tax rate yields the following:
Corollary 1 The tax rate T ∗1 financing an optimal non-zero bailout (when it exists) is decreasing
in the payoff of a successful project (R), increasing in the manager’s effort cost (c), and increasing
in the restart cost (I2).
As project revenues R grow, the firm owners become increasingly interested in reinvesting.
Consequently, they do not need as much of a subsidy to restart, thereby allowing a lower
tax rate. As the manager’s cost of effort c and the firm’s reinvestment costs grow, restarting
becomes less profitable to the firm, thereby necessitating a larger bailout and greater T1 taxes
to finance such.
3.1 Graphical Illustration of Base Model
We can illustrate the solutions with some examples. We normalize S = 1, and assume that
I1 = 0 (e.g., the initial firm investment is minimal, or sunk long ago). The investment cost
I2 = 0.1. Because we will consider revenues from R = 0 to R = 1, we choose the lowest c
parameter that works for all R, which is c = R+ S = 2.
Figure 1 is the main figure of our paper. The black dash-dotted line is the first best outcome.
Even if the project generates no revenues, the positive externalities mean that it would be
socially worthwhile for managers to work. Unfortunately, this would require an unobtainable
effort level in the presence of managerial moral hazard that can only be remedied with a
success-contingent salary.
19Although effort is only one example of moral hazard, our model intuition should readily extend to many
situation in which moral hazard creates other distortions (such as excessive risk-taking). By expropriating
managers in case of failure, moral hazard is lower.
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For low R, below 0.3222, it would not be socially optimal to restart the firm if it has failed
even in the absence of tax distortions. Irremediable intrafirm moral-hazard inefficiencies are
just too strong. Thus, government should not intervene in this region.
For high R, above 0.8944, it would be privately optimal to restart the firm even without
government intervention. The red dashed line is the social value if the original manager is
fired upon a restart, the blue line if she is kept on. The red line weakly dominates. Without
intervention, at R≈ 0.89, the expected social value jumps because the firm suddenly chooses
to continue.
In the region between 0.3222 and 0.8944, not the firm but only the government would
potentially want the firm to continue (sv > 0). However, for revenues below 0.7185 if the
manager is fired (and 0.7305 if not), the distortionary costs of taxation are too high to make
government intervention useful. The graph shows the two Laffer solutions—the inferior solution
with a higher tax rate and lower effort sufficient to satisfy the budget constraint is dotted. Thus,
for revenues above 0.7185, the government should have a policy of intervention. This gives the
social value a jump relative to non-intervention, from a non-intervention value of 0.2764 to an
intervention value of 0.3205. (The function is vertical at its vertex.)20
Figure 2 illustrates the solution variables associated with these parameters. It plots the tax
revenue T1, corporate profits Π (including expected continuation values), wages w1, managerial
effort e1, and managerial utility. Our discussion focuses on the cases in which the manager is
fired.
Consider the case in which government intervention is just feasible, R≈ 0.7185.
Without government intervention, the firm will shut down. Panel (A) shows that the firm
earns profits of Π≈ 0.065. Panel (B) shows that the manager’s utility is about M ≈ 0.032.
Panel (C) shows that the wage is w1 ≈ 0.359, and the managerial effort levels are
e1 = e2 ≈ 0.180.
With government intervention, the firm will restart. Panel (A) shows that a tax of T1 ≈ 0.33
on successful firms raises the funds necessary to pay for bailouts (which are 0.035).
Panel (B) shows that the firm now expects to earn a profit of 0.02. This is exclusively
from its first-period 10% probability of success, because the government expropriates the
existing shareholders in case of a bailout. A world with an active government thus leaves
the firm worse off relative to a world without an active government. Panel C shows that
the bailout also leaves incumbent managers worse off. They are fired in case of a bailout.
This is because, in comparison to the case without a bailout, their wage is lower. However,
if we take into account the welfare of the replacement manager (panel D), this is no
longer the case. Finally, Panel (F) shows that government intervention lowers the initial
in-equilibrium effort of the manager, despite the fact that both owner and manager are
20Note that there is also a kink at 0.89, because the owners’ first-order condition changes from optimizing
only their first-period profits [with government intervention] to optimizing their two-period profits [because the
government now lays off]. Moreover, unlike the government, the government also internalizes the welfare of the
manager. This in turn changes all solutions.
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expropriated in case of a bailout. This is the unremediable social moral hazard induced
by government intervention.
Relative to non-intervention, both the owners and the incumbent managers are worse off. It
is only the third party stakeholders that are better off.
Panel (A) shows that, as R increases, the government can tax less and less. Panel (B) shows
that corporate profits approach those in the absence of intervention. Note what happens at the
border where the government is indifferent between intervening and not intervening, because
the firm is about to continue on without government intervention. Panel B shows that if the
manager is not fired, her knowledge of the firm’s desire to restart makes her slack off in the
first period. This causes a discontinuity for the firm. Interestingly, if the firm could commit
itself not to restart so early, it would be better off, because managers would work harder in the
first period. (Of course, if the firm could simply fire the manager, as the government does in
case of a bailout, then the firm does not face this moral-hazard problem, either.)
4 Extensions
Our base model made a number of simplifying assumptions in order to isolate key intuitions. In
this section, we generalize that model through a number of extensions in order to illustrate the
robustness of our key results.
4.1 Heterogeneity of Managers
In our basic model, the replacement manager was as effective as the incumbent manager (i.e.,
the cost of effort, c, was equal). Theorem 1 showed that the government optimally fires a failed
manager, because the threat of termination increases managerial effort in the first stage. In
many situations, this is a plausible assumption, because failure may in itself be associated with
(and indicate) that the original manager was not particularly good and thus not better than her
potential replacement.
But we can also consider the case in which the new replacement manager (n) is not as
effective as the old incumbent manager (o), i.e., cn > co. The firm now faces a tradeoff. The
threat of termination upon failure still improves the incumbent’s incentives in the first stage.
But this needs to be weighed against the lower continuation value in the second stage—with her
higher cost of effort, the replacement will optimally work less. We now examine the conditions
under which the government can and will want to commit21 ex ante to firing failed managers.
Complicating the social welfare tradeoff is the fact that when cn > co, the bailout accompanying
managerial replacement (gn) exceeds the bailout accompanying managerial retention (go).
21With lower effort from the replacement, it is no longer time-consistent to fire the incumbent. Thus, we now
have to assume an ability to commit.
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This implies that the tax on successful businesses when the government fires the incumbent
(T n1 ) is greater than the tax when the government retains the incumbent (T
o
1 ).




































The ex ante social value associated with termination is




















































The ex ante social value associated with retention is















If the firm can commit to replacing the incumbent manager with a less efficient replacement, it
remains optimal to do so whenever V n ≥ V o, which is equivalent to the following condition on
cn.
Theorem 3 The optimal bailout policy with commitment replaces the incumbent manager if and
only if cn ≤ c̄ where c̄ > co.
(The proof is in Appendix A.8.) So long as the replacement manager is not too inefficient
relative to the incumbent, the improved effort that job insecurity elicits from the incumbent
more than compensates for the lower productivity of her replacement after a restart. Figure 3
illustrates an interesting comparative static. When the cost of restarting the project increases, it
becomes more important to fire a failing manager in order to motivate effort in the first stage.
Thus, c̄ increases in I2.
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4.2 Government Funding Constraints and Heterogeneity of Firms
In our basic model, the government’s budget must be in actuarial balance. That is, the expected
tax revenues from first- and second-period production must cover the expected costs of the
bailout. Given our result that T ∗2 = 0 for any optimal bailout, this means that the expected tax
revenues must be collected in the first period. The notion of an actuarial balance is critical,
because a single firm cannot both succeed and thus pay taxes, and also require a bailout. This
form of actuarial budget balancing is identical to an alternative budget balance condition
that requires aggregate tax revenues to offset aggregate outlays across a population of firms.
In essence, the population of “winner” firms (first-period successes) underwrite the bailout
population of “loser” firms (first-period failures). Of course, ex ante, because all firms are
identical, each is probabilistically both a payer of taxes and a recipient of bailout money.
The isomorphism between actuarial and aggregate budget balance may no longer hold,
however, when firms are heterogeneous. (For example, they may face different values of R.)
Firms with high enough R require no bailouts, because they will finance their own restarts.
Firm with low enough R also receive no bailouts, because it would be inefficient to rescue
them. It is only for some firms in the middle that bailouts are optimal. They may be efficiency
justified for some firms but not others. The resulting tax system to finance the bailout can
then take numerous forms. One possibility would be to constrain the bailout plan (and its
attendant taxes) only to firms who would be “eligible” (on efficiency grounds) for a bailout.
Our model can easily be extended to such a framework. Another possibility, would be to tax
all firms for first-period success, but target the bailout funds only to those firms for which self
financing is unprofitable, and bailouts are socially desirable. Although such a diffuse tax system
would impose burdens (with no benefits) on firms that would later not be eligible, it would
also spread the marginal inefficiency of the tax across firms, permitting the government to fund
the bailout at a lower total inefficiency loss.
4.3 Government Funding Constraints and Broader Taxation
In our basic model, we identified the distortionary costs of taxation by assuming that taxes
had to be raised from the same population of firms that may require bailouts. However, the
government may also have the ability to spread the tax burden, directly or indirectly, across
other populations. For example, it may be possible to tax the external stakeholders of the
firm—those whose interests are represented by public benefits S. Employees, contractors,
creditors, lessors, customers, and other stakeholders could and likely should, in principle, help
underwrite the costs of a bailout. Of course, in many situations, the stakeholders are too diffuse
to be identifiable (e.g., potential future customers, or unspecified “communities” that care
about the firm). However, from an efficiency perspective, this is not important. Taxes should be
raised where the efficiency losses are lowest.
Suppose now that the government can fund the bailout with a combination of firm-level
taxation, {T1, T2}, and general tax revenues, z. The new government budget-balance condition
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(BB′) is then




2·T2 ≥ (1− e
∗
1)·g.
We let the distortionary cost of raising general tax revenue be linear in revenues, i.e., k(z) = a·z,
where a > 0. We can then show the following:
Theorem 4 If the firm’s (IR) condition is satisfied22 and a bailout is socially desirable, the optimal
funding policy sets T ∗2 = 0 and consists of (i) only general taxation, z = g·[1− R/(2·c], if a ≤ a,
(ii) only firm-level taxation, T1 = T ∗1 , if a ≥ a, and (iii) both firm-level taxation, T1, and general
taxation, z, if a ∈ (a, a) where
a =
2·c·R+ 4·c·(S+ I2)− 3·R2/2− 2·R·S















2·c·(R+ T ∗1 ) + 4·c·(S+ I2)− 3·R
2/2− 2·R·S

















and T ∗1 is defined in Theorem 1. If a ∈ (a, a) the optimal firm-level taxation, T1, is decreasing in
c, S, and I2; increasing in a; and increasing in R for large R and large a but decreasing in R for
small R and small a.
The proof is in Appendix A.9. If social externalities (S) are large, then failure in either stage
is more costly. If restarting costs (I2) are large, then failure in the first stage is more costly. In
either case, it is then better to tax more externally rather than reduce effort incentives by taxing
firms. In contrast, if a is large, then external taxation is more expensive than firm taxation and
should be avoided.
4.4 Bailout Recipients, Hold Ups and Lobbying
In our model, the optimal bailout infuses just enough capital to induce reinvestment by the
firm, essentially ensuring its continuation profits are zero. It is conceivable that some firms may
simply turn down the bailout and refuse to reinvest, holding out for larger transfer payments
from the government. This danger may be particularly acute for “too big to fail” firms (e.g.,
Citibank, Bank of America), where S is also known to be very high.
We could adapt our model to assume that the bailout recipient firm is able to hold out
for some fraction of the total available public surplus, sv2. Introducing such hold ups into
the model would have negative welfare effects, because it sharpens the government’s budget
constraint, and reduces firms’ incentives to avoid bailouts. In turn, such hold ups would require
the government to levy a larger first-period tax on successful firms, thereby diluting firms’
22Introducing general tax revenues slackens the firm’s (IR) constraint, i.e., more projects will now be funded
initially because firm-level taxes are (weakly) lower.
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incentives to invest ex ante. When hold up problems are sufficiently large, bailouts could
eventually become unjustified on efficiency grounds and impossible to implement. One possible
way to contend with this possibility is to give government the power to force a company to
accept a bailout (and its attendant terms).
Interestingly, our basic model is robust to inside information about corporate revenues,
R, because the best equilibrium policy is to expropriate both management and shareholders
fully in case of failure. Thus, they have a (weak) incentive to reveal R truthfully. Extant inside
information issues would make it even more difficult to implement policies in which owners
and/or managers are allowed to continue on.
Other forms of influence costs could also be studied in our model, such as the abilities
of firms to lobby and distort the government’s process for either structuring the terms of
bailout. We conjecture that most of these extensions would similarly tend to reduce the
welfare-enhancing effects of targeted bailouts.
5 Related Literature
Most of the extant literature on bailouts seems more suitable to bank bailouts, while our own
paper seems more suitable to the car company bailouts. Thus, most of our literature review is
about papers that focus on banking.
The single closest paper to our own is Philippon and Schnabl (2011), in which a reduction
in lending by one bank can reduce other banks’ investments. Thus, the benefit of a government
bailout is a reduction in the systemic debt overhang, which enhances economically efficient
investment. The optimal contract makes each bank pivotal by conditioning a systemic bailout
on wide participation.23 The cost of the bailout is paid for by taxes on household endowments,
which causes a parametrically assumed efficiency loss that is linear in the tax required.
Our model shares some features but has different foci. For example, in our model, the social
benefits do not accrue to active and taxable participants. Thus, it is not possible to design a
contract that makes all parties willing to participate—after all, it is not the firms that lose if
a bailout does not take place. (The equivalent of the Philippon and Schnabl (2011) contract
would be to make a bailout contingent upon participation of each stakeholder.) Philippon and
Schnabl (2011) point out the social externalities among many banks, where all banks benefit
from more financial system stability. Our model focuses on bail-outs, in which individual firms
can be in trouble, rescuing one does not make it easier or harder to rescue another, and multiple
firms need not be rescued at the same time. (Our model can capture some time-varying and
23The paper also shows that if there is excessive participation in the bailout by banks which privately know
that they already have good projects, then the regulator can improve efficiency by demanding junior securities. It
would probably not be difficult to think of a situation in which the problem is too high an uptake by banks which
know that they should (socially) not be bailed out. In this case, debt may be a better contract.
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cross-sectional variation in the exogenous S parameter.) Yet another difference of our model
from Philippon and Schnabl (2011) is that inefficient investment in our model does not arise
because of a debt overhang problem. In fact, we do not view our model as much a model of
banks, as we view it of a model of government bailouts for generic non-bank firms, such as the
GM and Chrysler. But like Philippon and Schnabl (2011), we focus on the socially inefficient
aspects of firm behavior. Bailouts are needed because it is too costly for the firm to finance
continuation, given their struggle with their own internal moral-hazard (managerial agency)
problems. Our paper focused on on the internal and external moral-hazard problems and their
best remedies. Our distortive tax effects are endogenous, and not linear as in Philippon and
Schnabl (2011). We also offered specific policy recommendations (on managerial and owner
retention, bailout funding, etc.) different from those in Philippon and Schnabl (2011), and
showed that firms and managers—the Chamber of Commerce—will lobby for a system in which
they do not face a priori taxation to cover future bailouts.
Philippon and Skreta (2011) and Tirole (2011) study adverse-selection models, in which
firms differ in the publicly-unknown qualities of their existing assets. In contrast, our model
studies moral-hazard problems in firms with known assets and opportunities. In their models,
the government ends up subsidizing only the worst types, whereas in our model, the government
ends up subsidizing only the marginal types. In their models, the parameterized cost of public
funds is exogenous, whereas in our model, the costs of raising bailout revenue (through taxes)
is endogenous. This is important, because distortionary taxes (and T2, in particular) reduce
managerial effort and are thus directly responsible for our policy prescriptions. In Philippon
and Skreta (2011), the acceptance of government assistance sends a negative signal to outside
capital market participants, which increases the recipients’ private borrowing costs outside of
the program. Philippon and Skreta’s (2011) government objective is to obtain a target level
of investment that is the cheapest to taxpayers. In our model, the government maximizes
total social value instead. Their optimal government intervention is a debt contract. Our’s is
a direct subsidy (because any government stake raises the required subsidy to entice private
participants). In Tirole (2011), there is a spillover aspect of bailouts. The bailout of one firm
raises the cost of the next bailout. Firms become progressively more hesitant to participate
as progressively weaker banks have already been bailed out before them. Like Philippon and
Skreta (2011), the government takes stakes in exchange for its subsidy, though in equity and
direct purchases of firm assets, whereas in our model, the government should take no such
stake.24
There are also pre-2008 crisis papers in the banking literature in which bailouts can be
valuable. For example, in Diamond (2001), banks would lose socially valuable information
if allowed to disappear. In Gorton and Huang (2004), asset prices depend on liquidity, and
the government can enhance asset values by tapping its effectively unlimited credit. In
24Like us, Tirole suggests “just enough” intervention. Although moral hazard is not central to his analysis, he
demonstrates (as do we) that bailouts can exacerbate moral-hazard concerns. The paper does not derive an
optimal bailout in the presence of moral hazard.
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Aghion, Bolton and Fries (1999), managers can be reluctant to liquidate underperforming
loans when bank regulators close bankrupt banks aggressively. Bailouts are designed to
minimize such welfare losses. The classic paper advocating some government involvement is
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), which showed how the private market can fail and how deposit
insurance or convertibility restrictions can enhance the social outcome. As expected, deposit
insurance immediately raises moral-hazard concerns, e.g., as in Gorton and Rosen (1995),
Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992), Boyd and Runkle (1993), Calomiris (1999), etc. Ex-ante
regulation of the banking sector is usually recommended as a corollary to ex-post deposit
insurance.
Similarly, in a long number of papers on the subject of government procurement and
intervention, Tirole emphasizes how firms can game the system. For example, in Farhi and
Tirole (2011), firms correlate on exposures in order to benefit more from government bailouts:
...the central argument of the paper is that private leverage choices depend on the
anticipated policy reaction...An accommodating interest rate policy involves (a) an
invisible subsidy from consumers to banks (the lower yield on savings transfers
resources from consumers to borrowing institutions), (b) current costs, such as
the (subsidized) financing of unworthy projects by unconstrained entities, and (c)
deferred costs (the sowing of seeds for the next crisis, both through incentives for
maturity mismatch, going forward, and the authorities’ loss of credibility)...When
everyone engages in maturity mismatch, authorities have little choice but interven-
ing, creating both current and deferred (sowing the seeds of the next crisis) social
costs.
Finally, Diamond and Rajan (2005) is unusual in that governmental bailouts can backfire even
ex-post and themselves cause further insolvencies. Of course, although our paper has not
allowed for an additional direct waste parameter in the process of government intervention,
we do not suggest that one should ignore the governmental rent-seeking issues first raised in
Tullock (1967) and Tirole (1994). Although these papers raise significant real-world problems,
our own view of government intervention, though skeptic, is decidedly less pessimistic. Our
model’s assumption of an optimizing government was a useful analysis device, not a description
of real life. To the extent that rent-seeking makes government intervention more costly, it
shrinks the regions in which governmental intervention is beneficial. However, the main
insight—that when social externalities are large, bailouts can be optimal, and they tend to be
better if the managers are dismissed—is robust.
As far as know, no other model of bailouts has focused on the positive a priori incentive
effects of tieing bailouts with managerial dismissals.
29
6 Conclusion
In its final report to Congress in March 2011, the TARP Congressional Oversight Panel (COP)
offered the following assessment of the automotive industry bailout:
Treasury’s interventions in the automotive industry, in particular, raise moral hazard
concerns. In some ways, Treasury actually mitigated moral hazard through its very
strict approach to these companies: it forced GM and Chrysler to enter bankruptcy, a
step not required of other major TARP-recipient institutions. However, the mere fact
that Treasury intervened in the automotive industry, rescuing companies that were
not banks and were not particularly interconnected within the financial system,
extended the “too big to fail” guarantee and its associated moral hazard to non-
financial firms. The implication may seem to be that any company in America can
receive a government backstop, so long as its collapse would cost enough jobs or
deal enough economic damage. (Congressional Oversight Panel (2011), at 185).
Our model was designed to help frame and assess these concerns. It extended a canonical
agency model to explore the trade-offs of governmental interventions when tax-financed
bailouts—even as they help third-party stakeholders—could indeed exacerbate moral-hazard
problems in firms.
There are three key policy insights that emerged from our model. First, although bailouts
can be both feasible and efficiency enhancing, and even for firms outside the financial sector,
the government should be cognizant of its negative effects and use bailouts sparingly, rescuing
only those distressed firms where external stakes are significant and bailout costs are modest.
Second, the government should usually expropriate existing owners and management in any
bailouts, not just because failed managers are more likely incompetent, but because this reduces
the moral hazard that bailouts create. And third, the government should not finance bailouts
through extraordinary levies on bailed-out firms, but through levies on healthy firms.
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A.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions For an Interior First-Best
Solution
This appendix describes the necessary and sufficient conditions for eFB1 and e
FB
2 to be interior.
For eFB2 to be interior, there are two conditions:













2. The first-order condition cannot induce an effort level exceeding 1,
(R+ S)
c
≤ 1 ⇔ c ≥ R+ S .
For eFB1 to be interior, there are two binding conditions:









≥ 0 ⇔ I2 ≥
(R+ S)2
2·c
− (R+ S) .
In other words, if it is too cheap to restart 2 to expend effort, it may not be socially optimal to
expend any effort in the first period (other than the requisite start up costs). I2 ≥ 0 guarantees
that c > R+ S.
2. Ex-ante, the project must obtain non-negative net social value, or SV ( eFB1 , e
FB
2 ) ≥ 0. Using the
expression for SV ( eFB1 , e
FB
2 ) above, under the first-best effort, it is optimal to invest initially in the
project iff





































However, this constraint is never binding, because the constraints on eFB2 posit that I2 ≤ (R+ S)
2 /(2·c)
and c ≥ (R+ S).
In sum, an interior first-best solution obtains if
R+ S ≤ c ,





























A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Note first that a bailout is never optimal when π2(0,0 ) = R2/(4·c)− I2 ≥ 0, because the firm would
refinance the project in the absence of a government bailout, and taxes are purely distortionary.Thus,
there is no bailout, and g∗ = T ∗1 = T
∗
2 = 0. The government would consider a bailout only if π2(0, 0 )< 0.
In Section 2, we showed that for a given (g, T2), the optimal managerial effort in the reinvestment stage
is e∗2 = (R− T2)/(2·c) and the firm’s continuation value at the reinvestment stage is





+ g − I2 .
Thus, the government must choose g ≥ I2− (R− T2)2/(4·c)≡ g c > 0 to make it worthwhile for the firm
to continue.
The expected government revenue in the reinvestment stage is e2·T2 = (R− T2)·T2/(2·c). Thus, the
minimum cost of the bailout, net of government revenue, in the reinvestment stage to encourage the
firm to continue is














·(R2− T22 ) ,
which is increasing in T2. Consequently, in the reinvestment stage, the government cannot slacken the
budget balancing constraint (BB) by raising T2, because this causes firm profits to decline, requiring an
even larger transfer g to encourage the firm to continue.
Furthermore, the social continuation value at the reinvestment stage is
















which is decreasing in T2 but independent of g. This reflects the fact that the tax T2 is distortionary, but
the transfer g is not. Thus, because T2 > 0 does not slacken the constraint (BB) and T2 = 0 maximizes
the social continuation value at the reinvestment stage, it follows that the government optimally sets
T ∗2 = 0.
In the reinvestment stage, the government is indifferent among all g ≥ I2− R2/(4·c) because g is a
pure transfer. However, if T ∗2 = 0 the government’s budget balancing condition is
e1·T1 ≥ (1− e1)·g ,
where e1 = (R− T1)/(2·c) if the initial manager is replaced in the reinvestment stage and e1 =
(R− T1)/(2·c)− R2/(16·c2) if the initial manager is retained. In either case, initial effort is independent
of g and decreasing in T1. Thus, it is optimal to set g
∗ = I2− R2/(4·c).
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
From the analysis in Section 2.2.1, we can derive
































·π2 (0,0 ) , (A.1)
where π2(0, 0 ) = R2/(4·c)− I2 ≥ 0, by assumption. From the analysis in Section 2.2.1,










































because c > R.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
If the replacement manager has the same effort cost as the initial manager, then the social continuation
value at the reinvestment stage is identical with either manager and is
sv∗2(g
















because T ∗2 = 0 by Theorem 1. The government’s objective is to maximize
SV = e1·(R+ S)−
c
2
·e21 + (1− e1)·sv
∗
2(g
























2·c if the initial




16·c2 if the initial manager is not replaced. The result follows
because social value is increasing in initial managerial effort and e1 is higher when the initial manager is
replaced.
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A.5 Proof of Lemma 3
If π∗2(0,0 ) = I2−
R2
4·c < 0 and there is no government intervention, we showed that the firm does not





In this case, the incumbent manager receives the expected payoff M = R
2
8·c .
If π∗2(0, 0 ) = I2−
R2
4·c < 0 and there is government intervention, the incumbent manager is fired, and
the firm’s maximized profits are






In this case, the incumbent manager receives the expected payoff M = (
R−T1)2
8·c . The results follow
immediately.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 2
The first condition in the theorem (which is necessary but not sufficient) follows immediately from
Theorem 1, and no bailout is necessary when π∗2(0,0 ) ≥ 0. The second condition relates to the
financibility of the bailout, and requires the following additional intermediate lemma:
Lemma 4 The set of feasible government bailouts is





The proof of this lemma is as follows. Because T ∗2 = 0 from Theorem 1 and the government prefers
replacing the initial manager from Lemma 2, it must be the case that e∗1 =
R−T1
2·c and the government’s
budget balance condition (BB) is








(R− T1)·T1− (2·c− R+ T1)·g

≡ F(T1) . (A.3)
First, note that F(0 ) = −(2·c−R)·g
2·c < 0 and F(R ) = −g < 0. Second, note that FT1 =
R−2·T1−g
2·c ≥ 0 if
T1 ≤ (R− g)/2 and FT1 =
R−2·T1−g
2·c ≤ 0 if T1 ≥ (R− g)/2. Third, note that F( T1 ) is maximized at








. Thus, there exists a solution to (BB) if and







As noted earlier, however, the optimal bailout must sets g∗ = I2−
R2
4·c , which, when combined with









This yields the second condition stated in the theorem.


































But because incentive compatibility requires also that e∗1 =
R−T1
2·c , we can substitute out first-period effort




























This is equivalent to




















This is the third condition in the theorem.
Thus far, we have demonstrated conditions that ensure a bailout is feasible, incentive compatible,
financible, and potentially welfare enhancing. Although each condition is necessary for a non-zero
bailout to exist, they become sufficient if the bailout is welfare enhancing. The fourth condition in the
theorem compares whether the optimal non-zero bailout is socially preferable to non-intervention. That
is, it must be the case that the social value (SV from eq. 2), with e1 = e∗1 = (R− T
∗
1 )/(2·c) (from eq. A.4,
assuming that the manager is fired) and T1 = T ∗1 (from eq. A.5, again assuming that the manager is
fired), and e2 = e∗2 = R/(2·c) exceeds social value without intervention, i.e., sv1 (eq. 1), with e1 = R/(2·c)
(from eq. 4). The condition that g > 0 in the theorem assures that the firm would shut down in the
















where e∗1 is defined in (A.4).
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A.7 Proof of Corollary 1
As defined in (A.3), the budget (which has to be weakly positive according to (BB)) is





(R− T1)·T1− (2·c− R+ T1)·g

.
Furthermore, there are two values of T ∗1 such that F( T
∗
1 ) = 0 if [(R+ g)
2− 8·c·g] > 0. However, the
lower value of T ∗1 is socially desirable, because it leads to higher managerial effort, e1. From the proof of
Lemma 4, we also know that F( T1 ) first increases in T1, then decreases in T1. Consequently, FT ∗1 > 0 at
the lower of the two values of T ∗1 . The comparative-statics results then follow from the Implicit Function












·(2·c− R+ T1)> 0










·(2·c− R+ T1)< 0 .
(The optimal tax and intervention are not functions of social surplus S if the government bails out the
firm. It is not valuable for the government to subsidize more than g∗, regardless of how large S is.)
A.8 Proof of Theorem 3















The left-hand side of the inequality is decreasing in cn (since T n1 is increasing in c
n) and the right-hand
side is independent of cn, hence, there is a threshold c̄ such that V n ≥ V o for all cn ≤ c̄. Furthermore,





o when cn = co, thus c̄ > co.
A.9 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof: Lemma 1 continues to hold in the presence of general tax revenues, so T ∗2 = 0. If the firm’s (IR)
condition is satisfied, the government’s problem is given by:
max
T1
V ∗ = e∗1·(R+ S)− 0.5·c·e
∗2
1 + (1− e
∗
1)·sv2− I1− a·z,
Imposing the (IC) conditions for managerial effort and, by Lemma 1, imposing the new budget-balance









































Taking the derivative of V ∗ with respect to T1 yields:




























Setting this equal to zero and collecting terms yields:
T ∗∗1 =




2·c − (1+ a)I2
0.5+ 2a
.




Recall that T ∗1 in Proposition 1 is the firm-level tax that fully funds the bailout when the government does
not have access to general tax revenues (z = 0). It is straightforward to show that (i) T ∗∗1 is increasing




1 if a < a, and (iv) a < a. The comparative statics results follow
immediately from the expression for T ∗∗1 .
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B Figures
Figure 1: The Social Value Function (SV)

























































































Parameters: S = 1, c = 2, I1 = 0, I2 = 0.1. Dashed lines apply in the absence of government. Solid
lines apply in the presence of government. (Their dotted continuation lines are the inferior Laffer
solution.) Blue lines apply in cases in which the manager is retained, red lines to cases in which the
manager is fired.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Behavior and Utility as Function of R
(A) Tax T1 (B) Total Firm Profit Π



















































































































(C) Incumbent Manager Utility M (D) Both Managers’ Utility M
























































































































(E) Manager Wage w1 (F) Manager Effort (Success Probability) e1


























































































































Parameters: S = 1, c = 2, I1 = 0, I2 = 0.1. Dashed lines apply in the absence of government, except
in panel D where additional dashed lines to the left of 0.7185 copy the incumbent manager’s utility
from panel C. Solid lines apply in the presence of government. (Their dotted continuation lines are the
inferior Laffer solution.) Blue lines apply in cases in which the manager is retained, red lines to cases in
which the manager is fired. The black dash-dotted line in (F) is the unachievable first-best (effort).
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Figure 3: Change in Critical Level of Managerial Competence, c̄







Parameters: S = 1, R= 1, c = 1, I1 = 0.
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